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ON CONSTRUING STATUTES BY EQUITY.'
From the time of Aristotle, as we know by his writings yet
extant, and probably from a period more ancient, down almost to
this moment, it has been the concurring opinion of all philosophers
and lawyers who have delivered their sentiments upon the subject,
and a settled doctrine in the jurisprudence of every civilized community, that positive laws or legislative enactments (except such as
are penal, about which there has been some contrariety,) should be
construed by equity: The meaning of which is, not that the courts
or any class of them, in dealing with any such law, should exercise,
or would be justified in asserting, an equitable control over the
known intentign of the lawgiver ; but only that, in the process of
ascertaining what is his intention, the spirit rather than the letter
of his enactments should be regarded. Arist. Rhet. lib.1, c. 13;
Ethic. Nicom. lib. 5, c. 10; Grot. de Jure Bell. & Pac. lib. 2, c. 16,
sec. 26; c. 20, sect. 27; de Aequitate, sect.- 12; de Indulgentia,
sect. 4; Puffend. de Jure Nat. & Gent. lib. 1, c. 6, sect. 17; lib.
5, c. 12, sect. 21; de Off. Hom. & Civ. lib. 1, c. 2, sect. 10; Elem.
Jur. Univ. lib 1, sect. 22, 23; Tayl. Elem. Ci. Law, 3d edit.,
pp. 90-98; Ashe's Epieikeia, Introd.'
I Quarterly

Law Journal for April, 1858, pp. 150-166.

2 It is a common opinion, (Plowd. 465-466, note to Eyston vs. Studd; Bac. Abr.
tit. Statute, I. 6 ; Woodd. Syst. View, lect. 7, pp. 192-193, 1st edit.) countenane(d
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Blackstone has set this matter in a clear and strong light, in a
passage of his Commentaries, which is repeated by Tucker verbatim,
and, with no material alteration, by Stephen and by Story. His
words are: "It is said that a court of equity determines according
to the spirit of the rule, and not according to the strictness of the
letter. But so also does a court of law. Both, for instance, are
equally bound, and equally profess, to interpret statutes according
to the true intent of the legislature. In general laws all cases cannot be foreseen, or, if foreseen, cannot be expressed: some will arise
that will fall within the meaning, though not within the words of
the legislator; and others, which may fall within the letter, maybe
contrary to his meaning, though not expressly excepted. These
cases, thus out of the letter, are often said to be within the equity
of an act of parliament; and so cases within the letter are frequently out of the equity. Here, by equity, we mean nothing but
the sound interpretation of the law ;" not that the courts of equity
(so called) are more trusted or more obliged, than courts of law, to
give effect to such an interpretation. "Each endeavors to fix and
by many great and venerable names, that Aristotle, in the Nicomachaean Ethics, as
well as in his Rhetoric, speaks of judicial equity, known in his time to the courts,
and applied by them in their administration of law. We defer respectfully to that
opinion, but must confess that we do not concur in it; for, as it strikes us, what he
says in the first mentioned of those works, describes a moral virtue, which no courts
could have ever enforced, and by which its possessor, from considerations of enlarged
justice-a justice beyond the law-yields voluntarily something which, if le
demanded it, or resisted a demand for it, the courts would and must adjudicate in
This remark, however, is of no moment to the matter atpresentin hand,

his favor.

inasmuch as there can exist no doubt that the same author, inhis other work, above
mentioned, does speak of the kind of equity discussed in this article; and if he did
not, a sufficient antiquity for it would be discoverable from other sources ; as may be
seen in this learned Introduction of Ashe, and in the article on equity to which we
refer in Taylor's Elements of the Civil Law.

But the remark naturally suggests

another of more consequence; that it is to be regretted, we should have only one
and the same word for denoting three things so different, as the two species or rather
genere of equity here noticed, and that other, which in modern times, in England
and in America, has become so much more conspicuous than either, and which is
distinguished from both, better perhaps than anywhere else, in the firstchapter of
Story's Equity Jurisprudence.
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adopt the true sense of the law in question; neither can enlarge,
diminish, or alter that sense in a single tittle." 3 Black. Com.
430-1; Tuck. Comm. B. 3, ch. 21, p. 388, edit. 1887; 4 Steph.
Com. 2-3; Stor. Eq. Juris. sect. 15. See, also, 1 Woodd. Syst.
View, lect. 7, pp. 192-199, 1st edit.
"In this sense, equity," says Story, (-Equity Jurns. sect. 7,)
"must have a place in every rational system of jurisprudence."
Yet its ejection out of our own has been attempted.
This attempt is made by Mr. Sedgwick, in his copious, elaborate,
and learned treatise On the Interpretationand Application of Statutory and Constitutional Law, which appeared during the last
year. 'He, as we understand him, distributes quoad hoe all statutes
into two principal classes ; one consisting of those, in which the
language is clear and plain to such a degree that no two competent
judges of mere language could differ about its meaning; the other
of those, in which the language is obscure or ambiguous: and this
latter class he subdivides into, first, those in which, by the help of
what he calls legitimate aids, enumerated in his sixth chapter, a
determinate meaning is capable of being affixed to the words used;
and secondly, those in which no such meaning can be, through any
such help, wrought out. In cases falling within the latter of these
subdivisions, (pp. 259, 264, 291, 293-294, 311-312, 379-380,) he
ascribes to the judiciary a quasi-legislative power, to make a rule
where some rule must be applied, and the legislature have, in their
attempt at framing one, failed; in all other cases of this class,
(pp. 230, 235, 258, 294,) he regards the courts as properly fulfilling the office of interpreters and expositors of the law: but in
cases of the first class, (pp. 231-232, 235, 295-296, 305-310, 379,)
he considers that always, (at least in modern times, and in America, more especially,) where they have applied the doctrine of
equitable construction, so as to go one tittle beyond, or to stop one
tittle short, of the exact letter of the statute, they have been
usurpers of power that did not of right belong to them.
With regard to-this last point, which alone we propose at this
time to consider, we differ widely from Mr. Sedgwick; as to the
ground of his doctrin.e, utterly; perhaps, as to the results of it, not
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toto ecelo. He himself confesses, that herein he stands opposed to,
not only the whole body of the Civil Law and civilians, the best
writers, if not all writers, on general jurisprudence, and the whole
body of the early and medioval Common Law and writers upon it,
but also numerous very modern decisions of the courts on both
sides of the Atlantic. Of these he cites many, and declares that
the number might easily be increased; but he pronounces them all
unsound. Pp. 296-306. In contending with one who takes such
ground, it seems to be to no purpose to display the vast multitude
of decisions which have been made expressly contrary to his doctrine before the time of its being promulgated,-his book is so very
recent that probably none can be found since,-yet we cannot
refrain from pointing attention to the volume of Ashe, entitled
Epieikeia, published in 1609; in which mere references to those
passages in the few English law-books then extant, which contain
authorities establishing the construction of particular statutes by
equity, fill two hundred and fifteen numbered leaves, or four hundred and thirty pages,-sustaining almost to the letter the statements of Plowden, in his note appended to the report of Byston vs.
Studd, (Plowd. 465-467,) that "the sages of our law, who have
had the exposition of our acts of parliament, have in cases almost
infinite restrained the generality of the letter of the law by equity,
which seems to be a necessary ingredient in the exposition of all
laws," and that "there are an infinite number of cases in our law,
which are in equal degree with others provided for by statutes, and
are taken by equity within the meaning of those statutes." I It is
upon principle, against all such authority, that the standard of
revolt is now reared; and upon principle we will discuss the new
doctrine, in favor of which it is thus endeavored to displace the old.
IAshe, in his Introduction, makes the same division of equity, giving several
definitions of each of the two kinds ; and in fol. 1726-209b, he collects references to
examples of the restraining kind, under the heading: 'Euitie incounter la letter.
Ou et in queuz statutes legenerality desparols serra restraineper constructionfait per
equitie, etexposition fait sur iceuse encounter la luter et losparols inesmes.' His examples of enlarging equity are even much more numerous, and are methodically

distribnted under no less than eighteen different heads.
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As introductory to such discussion, it seems expedient to present
a more complete analysis and exposition, than has yet been offered,
of the latter. The kind of equity, then, which we are considering,
is conversant about determining what cases come within the operation of a particular statute, and what is its operation in them ; and
it either enlarges beyond the letter, or restrains within limits less
extensive than it, the scope of the statute, or its operation, or both.
Thus, it may not be possible, in point of grammatical construction,
to make the words of a statute extend so far as to comprehend
certain cases, or to produce a certain effect to the cases they do
comprehend; yet it may seem, that such cases outside of the letter
ought to have the same rule applied to them, as is applied to cases
that are within it, and also tl~at such effect is necessary for accomplishing the design of the legislature: Or, it may be that the language is so general as to comprehend a variety of cases materially
distinguishable in their circumstances, perhaps even contrasted, or
to produce an effect beyond what the design of the legislature calls
for; and then it may seem, that some of the cases so comprehended
ought not to be within the operation of the statute at all; or that
its operation ought to be less extensive than the full latitude of its
words. Now, between that equity which, on the one hand, enlarges the range of the statute or its efficacy within its true range,
and that which, on the other, restricts either, there is this observable difference: All men, knowing what it is they do contemplate,
are apt to use words which are large enough to embrace it; but all
men, being unconscious necessarily of what they do not contemplate, are liable to employ general words that (literally taken) have
a sense more comprehensive than is suited to their present design.
Hence, to say that a law does mean something not expressed in it,
is a stronger measure than to say that its general phraseology comprehends not only all which it was intended to mean, but also
something not thought of or de facto contemplated in making it.
In other words, it is less natural to suppose that the legislator has
left out some case, which was in his contemplation, and for which
he did intend to provide, or has omitted some part of the provision
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he had meditated, and did design making; than that, from an incautious or unskillful use of general language, he has included in
the letter, cases which never were in his contemplation, or has
given to the provision he designed making an amplitude beyond
what he ever intended. Bestraining equity, therefore, is only a
candid interpretation of the lawgiver's language; and merely says,
that his words shall operate so far and no further, because he did
not mean all they are capable of expressing, dixit sed non voluit.
Enlarging equity, on the other hand, lies open to the objection,
at least plausible, that presumably the legislator did not mean
more than he has said, and at any rate, if he meant more, he has
not said it, voluit sed non dixit; whereas statute law must consist
of both the intention and the expression. And thus it, at least,
may be said, that while restiaining equity is proper, because it
merely neutralizes the expression where the intention is absent,
enlarging equity can be nothing else than judicial legislation, because it enforces as law that which lacks the requisite expression,
if (even) the intention be not also wanting.
Plowden, in his note before mentioned, after dividing equity into
two kinds, and giving a definition and numerous examples of the
restraining sort, says "the other kind of equity differs much from
the former, and is, in a manner, of a quite contrary effect ;" and
then he defines and exemplifies enlarging equity, in such manner as
to show that "cases which are in equal degree with others provided
for by statutes, are taken by equity within the meaning of those
statutes." We believe that this is the view which has been generally, perhaps universally, taken of such cases, conformably with
the decantation, that "a thing which is within the intention of the
makers of a statute, is as much within the statute as if it were within
the letter." Bac. Abr. tit. Statute, I, 5; Dwarr. Stat. 691, 1st ed. ;
15 Missouri Rep. 519, 1iddick vs. Valsh. It seems, however, to
be of little practical importance, whether in these cases the statute
operates directly, or by analogy, in like manner as courts of equity,
when not bound by statutes of limitation, have nevertheless applied
them where the circumstances were such as that they would have
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been applicable in a court of law. Since, either way, the same end
is accomplished, and that natural love of justice in the human heart
is satisfied, which so vividly responds to the appeal, "valeat aequitas, qum paribus in causis pariajura desiderat," (Cic. Top. sect.
4;-Bract. lib. 1, c. 4, sect. 5, fol. 3 a; Co. Litt. 24b,) and to the
more homely law maxim, ubi eadem ratio ibi idem jus.
These considerations do not apply to the other species of enlarging equity, relative to the operation of a statute in cases that come
within it. That species, indeed, we feel (perhaps as much as half,)
inclined to surrender to the condemnation of Mr. Sedgwick-not,
however, upon his ground, but upon the ground which we have indicated before; and therefore it is with reference only to restraining
equity, that from this point the discussion will be carried on. This
we cannot give up to him.
He condemns and rejects promiscuously all the kinds and species
we have been taking pains to distinguish, at least wherever the language of a statute is plain, upon the broad ground that the courts
can in no case depart from what is so written; because (as we
understand his reasoning) the principles of civil freedom, as now
understood in England and here, and the very terms of our fundamental laws in most or all of the States of this Union, require that
the legislative and judicial departments of government shall be distinct, and that neither of them shall exercise the functions of the
other. But it seems difficult, and to us is impossible, to conceive
how the courts can be more guilty of usurping power that does not
belong to them, or how they can be properly said to contain themselves within their own province less, when they diligently seek, and
faithfully (to the best of their judgment) execute, the lawmakers'
intention, in cases which, according to that distribution of statutes
we have heretofore ascribed to Mr. Sedgwick, fall within the first
class, than when they do the like in cases that fall within either
subdivision of the second. On the contrary, we hold with Blackstone, Tucker, Stephen, Story, that in all cases it is the duty of a
judge "to endeavor to fix and adopt the true sense of the law in
question, not enlarging, diminishing or altering that sense in a single
tittle ;" and with Puffendorf, (de Jure Nat, & Gent. lib. 1, c. 6,
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sect. 17,) Taylor, (Elem. Civ. Law, 8d edit., p. 97,) and a host besides, that this equity is not of grace, but of right, not of favor, but
of justice, and that the judge who follows the letter, vhen he ought
to decide according to the spirit, does not less violate the law than
he who sets himself above it, and distinguishes where that, rightly
understood, has not distinguished. Indeed, Mr. Sedgwick himself
repeatedly (pp. 229, 231, 232, 235, 259, 291, 294, 295, &c., &c.,)
lays it down, that in construing a statute the object to be sought is
the intention of the legislature ; and therefore the controversy between us seems to be narrowed to the question, whether that intention can be less extensive than the language of the statute, where
the language is plain-or, to put it in the form most favorable to
him, whether it can be sufficiently known to be so. He maintains
the negative, (pp. 306-307,) we the affirmative.
On an issue like this the appeal must be to common sense; and
therefore, without calling any of the multitudinous witnesses in our
favor, as all those are who have made the decisions of this kind
reprobated by Mr. Sedgwick, or have maintained a similar doctrine,
we bring the matter at once to that standard. A statute ordains,
that if a prisoner confined upon a charge of felony break prison,
that shall make him a felon; a prison takes fire, and such a prisoner
breaks it to save his life, (Plowd. 13, arg. in Ben iger vs. .ogossa;
another statute ordains, that whoever shall do a certain act, shall
be a felon and suffer death ; a madman, or an infant not yet doli
capax, does the act, (Plowd. 465, note to _Byston vs. Studd;)-in
these cases is the prisoner, the madman, or the infant, a felon within
the meaning of the respective statutes? We suppose that there
can be but one answer. Bac. Abr. tit. Statute, I. 6. And if in
these extreme cases the issue must be decided in our favor, that settles the principle. In other cases it may be more dubious, whether
the legislature have meant all, or less than all, that is said, but the
possibility that they .may have used words capable of meaning more
than they meant, and that this may be satisfactorily shown, cannot,
after the preceding instances, be successfully negated.
We think that on this point Mr. Sedgwick is in error, and that
the source of his error may be detected by means of what he lays
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down in p. 230 of his volume. He there says, that in discharging
the duty of construing a statute, "the first thing is to have a clear
idea of the object in view. What is doubtful? The answer evidently is, the intent of the legislature who passed the act. What
did the legislature in fact intend ? The doubt does not refer to the
policy of the act; for with that, as we have seen, the judges have
nothing to do. They are judges, and not law-makers. Nor does
the doubt regard the motive of the legislator, for over that the
judges have no right of control." And from thus compelling them
to ignore all that goes to make up the spirit of the statute, it follows necessarily that he must confine them to the mere letter of the
law, wherever that can afford any certain rule of decision.
Now, we agree with him, that in one sense the judges have nothing
to do with the policy of the act. They are (ordinarily) not to judge
the law, but to judge by it; "non de legibus judicare, sed secundum ipsas," in the words of the quotation from St. Augustine, with
w hich (p. 228, n.,) Mr. Sedgwick favors us. They are, accordingly, not to say that the policy of the statute is good, and therefore they will enlarge its operation; or bad, and therefore they will
narrow it; agreeably to the opinions which in another place (p.
808,) he has collected. And for precisely the same reason they
cannot control the motive. But it is the business of every expositor of a statute to ascertain what in point of fact is the policy, what
the motive; in order that the construction which he shall adopt
may be neither repugnant to, nor discrepant from, either, but in
harmony with both. And this is the course which in a vast majority of instances, if not in all, has been pursued from the earliest
dawn of judicature among our ancestors down to a very recent
period, if not absolutely to the -present time, among their descendants both in England and in America. What else mean those
appeals which are now being constantly made, by the judges in our
highest State tribunal, when engaged in construing our Virginia
Code of 1849, to the reports of the revisors upon which it was
founded ?
For the reasons which have been thus shortly and imperfectly
stated, we should think that, upon principle, if the matter were res
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integra, the doctrine thus handed down to us ab avtiquo is that
which ought still to prevail. But upon the ground of authority the
question is most important, if it can be regarded as a question at
all, whether the courts are at liberty now to discard it in favor of
even a better. Are they not under the same obligation in this matter, as in others, stare decisis ? And is not the rule of interpretation, according to which statutes have been construed in innumerable cases heretofore, to be considered as a thing decided in every
one of those cases? Moreover, is it not due to the legislature to
suppose, that they rely upon having their words interpreted with
the same candor, construed with the same equity, that has always
heretofore been applied under like circumstances ? And, upon all
these considerations combined, if the judges are to wheel-(military
men, we believe, call it facing)-short to the right about, ought
they not to wait for a signal in the shape of some fresh constitutional provision,-more especially seeing with what ease and rapidity constitutions in our day chase one another across the stage,instead of performing that evolution at the word of command of a
text-writer, or (worse still) sua sponte ?
In the remainder of this article we shall advert to some of the
most recent authorities, not mentioned by Mr. Sedgwick, that are
favorable to our view; and then notice those which he cites as
adverse to it.
In January, 1855 a case (Hawkins vs. Gatzercole, 31 EngI. L.
& E. Rep. 205,) was decided by the Lords Justices in England, who
concurred in holding, that a subject matter confessedly within the
words of a modern statute, made in the reign of Victoria, was not
within its operation; and upon that occasion one of them, Sir
George James Turner, used these expressions: "That [the particular subject matter in dispute is] within the words of the act, if
literally construed, cannot of course be disputed, but in construing
acts of parliament the words which are used are not alone to be
regarded; regard must also be had to the intent and meaning of
the legislature. The rule upon this subject is well expressed in the
case of Stradling vs. Norgan, in Plowden's Reports, in which case
it is said, at p. 204, 1The judges of the law in all times past have
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so far pursued the intent of the makers of statutes, that they have
expounded acts which were general in words, to be but particular
where the intent was particular.' And after referring to several
cases, the report contains the following remarkable passage at p.
205: 'From which cases it appears that the sages of the law heretofore have construed statutes quite contrary to the letter in some
appeara ace, and those statutes which comprehend all things in the
letter, they have expounded to extend but to some things, and those
which generally prohibit all people from doing such an act, they
have interpreted to permit some people to do it, and those which
include every person in the letter, they have adjudged to reach to
some persons only; which expositions have always been founded
upon the intent of the legislature, which they have collected sometimes by considering the cause and the necessity of making the act,
sometimes by comparing one part of the act with another, and
sometimes by foreign circumstances. So that they have ever been
guided by the intent of the legislature, which they have always
taken according to the necessity of the matter, and according to
that which is consonant to reason and good discretion.' The same
doctrine is to be found in Bystorn vs. Studd, in the same reports, p.
465, and the note appended to it, and many other cases. The passages to which I have referred, I have selected as containing the
best summary with which I am acquainted of the law upon this
subject. In determining the question before us we have, therefore,
to consider not merely the words of the act of parliament, but the
intent of the legislature to be collected from the cause and necessity of the act being made ; from a comparison of its several parts;
and from foreign meaning [matter] and extraneous circumstances,
so far as they can justly be considered to throw any light upon the
subject." And in a later case, (Crofts vs. ffliddleton, 35 Eng. L.
& E. Rep. 466, decided in March, 1856,) the same passage from
Stradling vs. Norgan, was incorporated info a very learned judgment of the other Lord Justice, Sir James Lewis Knight Bruce;
who took occasion to copiously illustrate a proposition he then
advanced, and which he had some three years before advanced in
another case, (Key vs. Key, 19 Eng. L. & B. Rep. 624,)-" leges
non ex verbis, sed ex mente, intelligendas."
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In like manner, it was said by one of the greatest of our American judges, Chief Justice Shaw, of Massachusetts, in June, 1834,
(15 Pick. 393, 402, Brown vs. Thorndike:) "Without at present
stopping to state the rules of construction, which are familiar and
uncontested, and which mostly result in considering the various
means by which the intent of the Legislature, in the act they have
made, can be discovered, it is well established that in the construction of remedial statutes, [by which we understand, in such connection, all that are not penal,] cases not within the letter of the
statute are taken to be within its spirit and equity, upon a reasonable certainty, arising from consideration of the statute, and of every
part and clause of it, and from the obvious end and purpose to be
accomplished by it, that it was so intended by the Legislature; and
also, that a case may come within the letter, which shall not be
judicially constructed to be within the act, because it is like manifest, to a reasonable certainty, that it was not so intended by the
makers of the act." And accordingly the following, among very
many other equally strong decisions, have been made under our
republican constitutions.
Where the words of a statute gave to a court equitable jurisdiction
in "all cases of trust arising under deeds, wills, or in the settlement
of estates," it was nevertheless held, upon general reasoning as to
the spirit and policy of the statute, that the jurisdiction so given
extended only to express trusts arising from the written contracts
of the decedent, and not to those implied by law, or growing out of
the official character or situation of his executor or administrator.
5 Greenl. 303, Given vs. Simpson. So, upon a statute enacting,
that " any child or children, or their legal representatives in case
of their death, not having a legacy given him, her, or them in the
last will of their father or mother, shall have a proportion of the
estate of their parents assigned unto him, her, or them, as though
said parent had died intestate; provided such child, children, or
grandchildren have not had an equal proportion of the deceased's
estate bestowed on him, her, or them in the deceased's lifetime," it
has been settled by repeated decisions, that in order to exclude an
unadvanced child or other descendant from a distributive share of
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the testator's estate, it is not necessary that such child or descendant should have anything given him or her by the will, but it is
sufficient, if it appears from the will, by such child or descendant
being named therein, (1 Mass. Rep. 146, Terry vs. Foster; 2 Mass.
Rep..570, Wild vs. Brewer; 3 Mass. Rep. 17, Church vs. Crocker;)
or by any other sufficient indication, (14 Mass. Rep. 357, Wilder
vs. Goss; 2 N. Hampsh. Rep. 499, Merrill vs. Sanborn,) that he
or she was not forgotten by the testator at the time of his making
it. 18 Picker. 166, 167, Tucker vs. Boston. So, finally, not to
multiply, as we might easily, citations of this sort usque ad nauseam,
upon statutes enacting that "no bargain, sale, mortgage, or other
conveyance of houses or lands, shall be good and effectual in law to
hold such houses or lands against any other person or persons but
the grantor or grantors and their heirs only, unless the deed or
deeds thereof be acknowledged and recorded ;" or that "no conveyance of a freehold in or lease for a longer term than seven years of
any land, shall be good and effectual in law to hold such land against
any person but the grantor and his heirs, unless the deed of conveyance be acknowledged and recorded, (3 Mass. Rep. 573, 583,
supplement; 2 Mass. Rep. 508, iBorcoss vs. Widgery ; 4 Mass.
Rep. 545, 546, Pidge vs. Tyler; 637, Farnsworth vs. ('lilds; 5
Mass. Rep, 450, 457-459, 469-477, Dudley vs. S'umrnmer; 6 Mass.
Rep. 29-30, Marshall vs. Fisk; 487, -Davis vs. Blunt; 10 Mass.
Rep. 61, Prescott vs. Heard; 407-408, Commonwealth vs. Dudley; 11 Mass. Rep. 158-159, Brown vs. Maine Bank; 14 Mass.
Rep. 300, Connecticut vs Bracish ; 1 Pick. 164, Priest vs. Rice ;
3 Pick. 152-153, McMechan vs. Griffing; 4 Greenl. 20, 26-27,
Porter vs. Cole; 8 Greenl. 99-100, Hewes vs. Wiswell;) or that
"every deed not recorded shall be adjudged fraudulent and void
against a subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration, whose
deed shall be recorded," (10 Johns. Rep. 457, Jacksonvs. Burgott; 17
Wend. 25, Van Rensselaervs. Clark;) or that "all deeds, relating to"
certain descriptions of land, shall be deemed "fraudulent and void
against a subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration, unless
first recorded," (9 Johns. Rep. 163, Jackson vs. Sharp;) or that
"all leases of" certain other descriptions of real estate, "and all
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transfers thereof, shall be recorded within twenty-four hours after
the execution thereof, at the expense of the lessee or assignee, and
in default thereof shall be void," (10 Johns. Rep. 466, Jackson vs.
West;) it has been held, in Massachusetts, Maine and New York,
that such deeds unrecorded are, as against the grantors and subsequent purchasers from them with notice, in all respects and in all
courts as valid as if they had been duly recorded. See also in
Pennsylvania, I Dall. 430, Levinz vs. Will; 4 Dall. 153, Stroud
vs. Lockhart; 4 Binney 140, 146, Correy vs. Caxton; 7 Watts,
261, Jacques vs. Weeks ; 7 Watts & Serg. 335, The Manuf. 4
Mechan. Bank vs. The Bank of Pennsylvania; 5 Barr, 473, S'oIons vs. .lfCullough. And here it may be remarked, as somewhat
curious, that Mr. Sedgwick has ignored all these decisions, though
several of them were in his own State, in that part of his book, (pp.
320-321) where he notices a contrary decision of the court of
King's Bench, in England, (5 Barn. & Ald. 142, Doe vs. Allsop,)
upon similar words of a statute there ; a decision, too, which possibly would not have been made, if it had not been settled long before in regard to that very statute, that a court of equity would
uphold the first deed, though unregistered, against such a subsequent
purchaser. 4 Bro. P. C. 2nd edit., 189-190, -Forbesvs..Doniston;
1 Stra. 664, Cheval vs. .Zichols; 2 Eq. Abr. 63, S.C.; 1 Eq. Abr.
358, Blades vs. Blades; 357-358, Beatniff vs. Smith; 3 Atk. 646,
Le Neve vs. Le NYVeve ; 1 Yes. Sen. 64; Ambl. 436; 2 White &
Tud.Lead. Eq. Cas. 21, S.C.; Ambl. 624, Sheldon vs. Cox; 2
Eden 224, S. C.; 1 Burr. 474, Worseley vs. De Mattos; 2 Ld.
Keny. 226, S. C.; Cowp. 712, Doe vs. Boutledge; 2 Ridgew. P.
0. 345, 428-429, Ohandos vs. Brownlow ; 1 Scho. & Lefr. 98-100,
Bushell vs. Bushell; 1 Ball & Beat. 290, 301-303, B.re vs.
Dolphin.
On the other hand he has collected (pp. 231, 243-247, 260-061,
307-311,) some decisions and more dicta, which, as stated by him,
seem to have a tendency towards his side of the question. These it
was not necessary, with his views-which we have already noticed
as blending promiscuously the different kinds and species of equity
-to reduce under any collocation or arrangement, having reference
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to those several kinds and species ; but we shall endeavor to marshal them in an order more suitable to the present discussion.
And, first, of those which concern restraining equity: The cases
he cites, in which unavailing attempts have been made at applying
it, are (in his order of mentioning them) Bosley vs. Mattingly, 14 B.
MIon. 89 ; Fisher vs. Blight, 2 Oranch 358 ; Case vs. Wildridge,
4 Indiana Rep. 51 ; Notley vs. Buck, 8 Barn. & Or. 467 ; Bez vs.
Stoke Damerel, 7 Barn. & Cr. 563; Bez vs. Ramsgate, 6 Barn.
& Or. 712; Bex vs. Baryam, 8 Barn. & Or. 99; Green vs. Wood,
7 Ad. & Ell. N. S. 178 ; Bex vs. Burrell, 12 Ad. & Ell. 460 ; Lamond vs. .iffe, 3 Ad. & Ell. N. S. 910; -Everettvs. Wells, 2
Scott's N.- R. 526 ; Newell vs. Te People, 3 Seld. 9 ; Bidwell vs.
Whitaker, 1 Michig. Rep. 469; Oommonwealth vs. Kimball, 24
Piqk. 370; .eIver vs. Ilagan, 2 Wheat. 25; Moss vs. Commis
sionersof Sewers, 4 Ell. & Bl. 670 ; Putnam vs. Longley, l1Pick.
487; Gore vs. Brazier, 3 Mass. Rep. 523; Langdon vs. -Potter,
3 Mass. Rep. 215; -Priestmanvs. The United States, 4 Dall. 2830, n.; and upon a careful examination of them all, we are prepared
to make and maintain the assertion, that there is not one of the
whole number, in which the decision conflicts at all with the principle already stated, as that which seems to us to be sound. In many
the attempt was preposterous ; in the rest unsustainable, because
there did not (though sometimes a dissenting judge thought there
did) exist any sufficient reason for supposing, that the legislature
had not meant precisely what it had said. Of course, we can not,
within our necessary limits, exibit even a brief analysis of each of
these cases, and therefore we shall not in regard to any ; but we
must notice some of the more remarkable dicta which Mr. Sedgwick has extracted from, them: premising the rather obvious general
remark, that where occasion does not require a judge to define accurately the position he lays down obiter, it is easy for him to fall
into some carelessness of expression ; and another general remark
as important, and hardly less obvious-which will receive an imme'diate illustration-that even good reporters cannot be trusted implicitly to give ns the very words or the precise sense of what does so
fall from the judges.
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Mr. Sedgwick (p. 246) tells us, from Scott's report of Everett vs.
TFells, that Tindal, C. J., therein said: "It is the duty of all courts
to confine themselves to the words of the legislature, nothing adding
thereto, nothing diminishing." But we can find, in the report of the
same case by Manning and Granger, (vol. 2, pp. 269-279,) no trace
of such a dictum, but this: "It is our duty neither to add to nor
take from a statute, unless we see good grounds for thinking that
the legislature intended something which it has failed precisely to
express."
In another place (p. 308) he quotes Chief Justice Shaw as saying, "The decisive answer is, that the legislature has made no such
exception. If the law is more restricted [restrictive] in its present
form than the legislature intended, it must be regulated by legislative action." But in the report at large of the case, (Commnon.
wealth vs. Kimball, 24 Pick. 366,) which related to an unlicensed
sale of spirituous liquor, attempted to be taken out of the operation
of a statute prohibiting it, on the ground that it was sold to be used
as medicine, we find, between the two sentences culled and juxtaposited by Mr. Sedgwick, the following: "It does not allude to the
object or purpose for which it is bought. Nor is it reasonable to
imply any such exception, because, having provided that it should
be lawful to sell spirits in a certain mode, there was no occasion for
making an exception; and such exception would lead to evasion and
abuse. It might be bought for one purpose, and used for any and
every other; and the danger to be apprehended from the abuse of
it would require restriction and regulation, as well in one case as the
other." Corrected thus, and still more if read with the entire context from which it is torn, the quotation will no longer have the
appearance, which it otherwise has, of making the truly learned and
able Chief Justice throw some discredit on a doctrine which (as we
have pointed out) he had himself advanced not long before.
In another place (pp. 310-311) he quotes "the Supreme Court
of the United States" as saying what was only said (if said in those
words at all) by Judge Chase, in the Circuit Court, whence the case
afterwards came into the. Supreme Court: and in the latter nothing of
the kind was uttered, but the case was decided upon a ground that
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would have made any such dictum most gratuitous. 4 Dal]. 28-84;
Priestman vs. The United States; 81, note 1, S. . in the Circuit
Court.
With like want of accurate statement, he tells us, (p. 281,) "it is
said by the Supreme Court U. S.: ' Where a law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, the
legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction;'"
whereas these are the words of Judge Washington, (9 Cranch, 399,
.Fisher vs. Blight, 1 Wash. C. C. Rep. 7, S. 0.,) in a dissenting
opinion-he standing alone against the rest of the court. Moreover, in the next sentence following these words, he says: "But if,
from a view of the whole law, or from other laws in pari materia,
the evident intention is different from the literal import of the
terms employed to express it in a particular part of the law, that
intention should prevail, for that in fact is the view of the legislature." A little further on, he says: "If the literal expressions of
the law would lead to absurd, unjust or inconvenient consequences,
such a construction should be given as to avoid such consequences,
if from the whole purview of the law, and giving effect to the words
used, it may fairly be done." And from the sequel of his opinion
it appear plainly, that by giving effect he meant giving some, not
full, effect. In the cases cited by Mr. Sedgwick, (p. 281,) from 14
B. Monr. 89, and (p. 247) from 1 Mich. Rep. 469, as the words
were susceptible of "but one interpretation,"-",but one construction,"-it was necessary to give that construction, in order that
they might have any effect.
Lastly (under this head) he tells us, (p. 260,) "in an early case,
(5 Rep. 118, b. Edrich's case,) the judges said, 'They ought not
to make any construction against the express letter of the statute,
for nothing can so express the meaning of the makers of an act as
their own direct words; index animi sermo.'" But in the original
is immediately added: "And it would be dangerous to give scope
to m .ke a construction in any case against the express words, when
the meaning of the makers doth not appear to the contrary, and when
no inconvenience will thereupon follow : and therefore in such cases
84
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a verbis legis non est recedendum." Which brings that passage of
Sir Edward Coke's writings, (for the words of the report are undoubtedly his,) into harmony with the other authorities of that
age, and even with the quotation from Lord Wensleydale, formerly Mr. Baron Parke, which (in the same page) Mr. Sedgwick
gives us.
The other authorities which he cites in support of his own view
relate to enlarging equity; they therefore do not make against
us, within the limits to which we have expressly narrowed the
present discussion. Indeed, we do not know that we shall differ
from him about one species of that kind of equity, when we shall
have fully made up our mind respecting it. But this is certain,
for the reasons which have been already mentioned, that all authorities which support that equity do necessarily a fortiori sustain
the kind we have been advocating. And therefore we shall bring
this article to a close with a citation of some of the cases of that
description to be found in our Virginia reports, purposely confining
the range of selection within a period that is recent.
Of this kind seems to be the case of The Bank of the United
,States vs. The Merchants Bank of Baltimore, 1 Rob. Va. Rep.
573; at any rate, in the opinion which Judge Allen delivered in
it, he shows that such are the cases of Williamson vs. Bowie, 6
Munf. 176, and Peter vs. Butler, 1 Leigh, 285. Of this kind,
also, beyond doubt, is the case of Green vs. Thompson, upon one
point of it, 1 Patt. & H. 427, 458. And so, too, is the case of
The Commonwealth vs. Adeock, 8 Gratt. 661, which being as strong
as any that can be conceived, we shall therefore state 'somewhat at
large. A statute (V. 0. 1849, ch. 208, sec. 86,) provides that "every
person charged with felony and remanded to a superior court for
trial, shall be forever discharged from prosecution for the offence,
if there be three regular terms of said court, after his examination,
without a trial; unless the failure to try him was caused by his
insanity, or by the witnesses for the Commonwealth being enticed
or kept away, or prevented from attending by sickness or inevitable
accident, or by a continuance granted on the motion of the accused,
or by reason of hisescaping from jail, or failing to appear accord-
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ing to his recognizance, or of the inability of the jury to agree in
Adcock, in due time after his being remanded,
their verdict."
was indicted, tried, and convicted; but, at his instance, the verdict
was set aside for a variance, and, at a subsequent term, a nolle
prosequi being entered on that indictment, another, for what was
really the same offence, was presented and found, upon which being
arraigned, he demanded his-discharge under the statute; and it was
on all hands agreed that, unless its operation was excluded by the
proceedings on the former indictment, his demand must be granted.
On the question whether such was the effect of the proceedings,
the judges of the general court was not unanimous, but all of them,
save one, maintained the affirmative. In delivering the opinion of
the majority, and after adverting to the position of the prisoner's
counsel, that the statute must be literally construed, "ita lex scripta,"
Judge Thompson said: "By adopting the construction contended
for, we should in truth be adhering to the letter and sticking in the
bark, [Plowd. 467, note to Eyston vs. Studd; Co. Litt. 54 b, 283 b,
365 b, 381 b ; Wing. Max. 19-21; Bac. Abr. tit. Statute, I. 5 ;]
we should violate the first rules of construction, as much as would
he who should decide that the law mentioned by Puffendorf, [do
Jure Nat. J Gent. lib. 5, c. 12, sect. 3,] which forbade a layman to
lay hands on a priest, not only applied to him who hurt a priest
with a weapon, but to him who laid hands on him for the purpose of doing him some office of kindness, or rendering him aid
and assistance, or that the Bolognian law, mentioned by the same
author, [bid.sect. 8,] which enacted that whoever drew blood in
the streets should be punished with the greatest severity, extended
to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person who fell down in
the street with a fit;' or that, in the case put by Cicero, or whoever
was the author of the treatise inscribed to Herennius, [lib. 1, c. 11,]
cited by Blackstone, [Comm. vol 1, p. 61,] as illustrative of a con'Thewords of Pnffendort, in an English dress, are as follows: "AtBologniait was
enacted, that whosoever drew blood in the streets should be severely punished, upon
which law a barber was indicted for opening a vein in the street, and it had like to
have gone hard with him, because it was added in the statute that the words should
be takenprecisely, without any interpretation."
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struction of law by its reason and spirit, the sick man was entitled
to the benefit of the law, (upon the vessel's coming safely into port,
though his remaining was the result of inability from sickness to
escape,) which law provided that those who in a storm forsook the ship
should forfeit all property therein, and the ship and lading should
belong entirely to those who staid in it." The result of an extended
discussion, conducted upon this principle, is stated by him in these
words: "The truth is, the statute never meant, by its enumeration
of exceptions, or excuses for failure to try, to exclude others of a
similar nature or in pariratione; but only to enact, if the Commonwealth was in default for three terms without any of the excuses
for the failure enumerated in the statute, or such like excuses, fairly
implicable by the courtsfrom the reason and spirit of the law, the
And thus, in a
prisoner should be entitled to his discharge."
criminalprosecution, a statute made in favor of liberty was restricted
to an operation within, by the court's enlarging exceptions to it beW. G.
yond, the letter of the law.'
Richmond.
3 See also I Virg. Cas. 319, Thompson's case; 2 Virg. Cas. 74, Lovett's cnse;
132, 162, Vance's case; 363, Santee's case; all cited and commented on by Judge
Thompson, 8 Gratt. 678, 679. And. upon the general subject, besides the authorities collected by our contributor, see 5 Mass. Rep. 380, 382, Pease vs. Whitney; 7
Blass. Rep. 523, 524-526, Supplement; 12 Mass. Rep. 383, 384-387, Somerset v,.
Dighton; 14 Mass. Rep. 92, 93, Whitney vs. Whitney; all of which are strong authorities in support of his view. The paper in 7 Mass. Rep. was a response, signed
by three of the judges (successively Chief Justices,) to a call of one House of the
Legislature, according to a practiue common in that State, and it contains these
expressions: "The constitution is law, the people having been the legislators ; and
the several statutes of the Commonwealth, enacted pursuant to the constitution
are law, the senators and representatives being the legislators. But the provisions
of the constitution. and of any statute, are the intentions of the legislature [legislators] thereby manifested. These intentiuns are to be ascertained by a reasonable
construction, resulting from the application of correct maxims, generally acknowedged aud received. Two of the,-e maxims we will mention: [.] That the natural
import of the words of any legislative act, according to the common use of them,
when applied to the subject matter of the act, is to be considered as expressing the
intention of the legislature ; unless the intention, so resulting from the ordinary
import of the words, be repugnant to sound acknowledged principles of national
p-olicy. And [2] if that intention be repugnant to such principles of national
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policy, then the import of the words ought to be enlarged or restrained, so that it
may comport with those principles ; unless the intention of the legislature be clearly
and manifestly repugnant to them: For, although it is not to be presumed that a
legislature will violate principles of public policy, yet an intention of the legislature repugnant to those principles, clearly, manifestly, and constitutionally expressed,
must have the force of law. In consequence of the application of these maxims,
similar express'ions in different statutes, and sometimes in the same statute, are
liable to, and indeed do, receive different constructions, so that the true intent of
the legislature may prevail. Now, we assume as an unquestionable principle of
sound national policy in this State, that, as the supreme power rests wholly in the
citizens, so the exercise of it, or of any branch of it, ought not to be delegated by
any but citizens, and only to citizens. It is, therefore, to be presumed that the
people in making the constitution, intended that the supreme power of legislation
should not be delegated but by citizens. And if the people intended to impart a
portion of their political rights to aliens, this intention ought not to be collected from
general words, which do not necessarily imply it, but from clear and manifest expressions which are not to be misunderstood. But the words '-inhabitants" or
"residents" may comprehend aliens, or they may be restrained to such inhabitants
or residents who [as] are citizens, according to the subject matter to which they
are applied. The latter construction comports with the general design of the constitution." And, after some further reasoning upon the subject, "It may, therefore, seem superflous to declare our opinion, that the authority given to inhabitants
and residentv to vote, is restrained to such inhabitants and residents as are citizens.
This construction, given to the constitution, is analogous to that given to several
statutes. Creditors may levy their execution on the lands of their debtors, and
hold them in fee simple, unless redeemed; although the words of the statute are
general, yet they are not deemed to include alien creditors: if they were so deemed,
then, under color of a judgment and execution, the rule of the common law, prohibiting an alien from holding lands against the Commonwealth, would be defeated.
So a general provision is made for the dower of widows: yet it is not supposed
that a woman, who is an alien, can claim, and have assigned to her, dower in the
lands of her deceased husband." [See 1 Lore. Dig. Ist edit., 80. For alike illustration upon the Virginia statutes of descents, compare V. L. 1794, 1803, 1814,
c. 93 ; V. C. 1849, e. 123, and see 2 Rand. 276, Barzizas vs. Hopkins ] The
case in 12 Mass. Rep. turned upon the construction of a statute in these
words-" all persons, citizens of this Commonwealth, who, before the 10th day of
April, 1767, resided or dwelt within any town or district in the then province of
Massachusetts Bay for the space of one year, not having been warned to depart
therefrom according to law, shall be deemed and be taken to be inhabitants of the
same town or district to every intent and purpose whatever;" and it was held that,
comprehensive as they were, they did not embrace the case of a minor, though illegitimate : because the court could "never presume it to have been the intention of
the legislature to remove infant children from the custody and protection of their
parents," or to separate even bastards, while minors, from their mothers.

